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RECENT CASES
means that any doctor performing an abortion without parental consent is
incurring the risk of civil liability.
Another factor which would operate to keep a physician from per-
forming abortions on at least younger minors is the Missouri statutory
provision requiring the patient's informed consent to an abortion.50 This
provision was upheld in Planned Parenthood, the Court saying, ". . . it is
desirable and imperative that it [the decision to abort] be made with full
knowledge of its nature and consequences."5 1 The physician might well
decide that the younger minor is incapable of giving this informed consent
and would refuse to perform the abortion to avoid criminal
responsibility.52
In short, the Court in Planned Parenthood refused to issue guidelines in
the area of third party consent provisions, thus paving the way for continu-
ing litigation on this subject. While spousal rights are limited, the Court
might uphold a requirement that the physician use reasonable means to
notify the spouse of his wife's impending abortion. The Court again de-
clined to extend the full panoply of constitutional rights to minors. As long
as the parents have no final veto, legislation which ensures the parents'
participation will probably pass constitutional muster. In other words, the
Court limited its holding to the particular facts of the case, forcing legisla-
tures to attempt to predict whether or not proposed legislation in this field
will withstand constitutional challenge.
BLYTHE CRIsT-BROWN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-WRIT OF PROHIBITION HELD
TO LIE AGAINST PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
State ex rel. Toedebusch Transfer, Inc. v. Public Service Commission'
The Public Service Commission 2 (hereinafter referred to as PSC),
without hearing relator's protests, issued fifty-one certificates of conveni-
ence and necessity authorizing certain motor carriers to operate vehicles
licensed for a certain weight. Before such certificates were effective, re-
50. § 188.020(2), RSMo (1975 Supp.).
51. 96 S. Ct. at 2840.
52. § 188.065, RSMo (1975 Supp.), provides that any physician who does not
comply with the informed consent provisions may have his license revoked. Section
188.075 makes non-compliance with § 188.020 a misdemeanor.
1. 520 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
2. The PSC primarily regulates the operation of utility companies, railroads,
trucks, and buses within the State of Missouri. § 386.250, RSMO 1969. The law
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lators, a group of common carriers, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition
in the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District. Relators contended
that the PSC did not have jurisdiction to take such action under section
390.030.2, RSMo 1969, as amended in 1971,3 because: (1) there was no
statutory authority for licensing of vehicles in that specific weight class; and
(2) section 390.030.2 was in violation of the state and federal constitutions.
The PSC contended that prohibition would not lie because exclusive origi-
nal jurisdiction was vested in the PSC and an exclusive method of judicial
review was provided in section 386.5 10, RSMo 1969. 4 The court of appeals
granted the writ of prohibition.5 The dissent questioned whether prohibi-
tion would lie, and the case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme
Court. The court held that a writ of prohibition would lie to determine the
jurisdiction of the PSC, but found section 390.030 constitutional and re-
fused to grant the writ of prohibition.6
A writ of prohibition is an order issued to a tribunal7 commanding it to
cease proceedings on a matter found to be outside its jurisdiction.8 Mis-
souri follows the traditional rule that prohibition is an extraordinary mea-
sure to be used only in cases where there is clearly no other adequate legal
remedy.9 Administrative agencies are subject to writs of prohibition under
governing the PSC is considered to be a complete scheme for the regulation of
public service corporations under its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Kansas City Transit,
Inc. v. PSC, 406 S.W.2d 5, 10 (Mo. En Banc 1966); State ex rel. PSC v. Missouri S.
R.R., 279 Mo. 455, 464, 214 S.W. 381, 384 (1919). See generally Davis, The Missouri
Public Service Commission, 42 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 279 (1974).
3. The 1971 amendment directed the PSC to issue certificates authorizing
operations of vehicles licensed for a gross weight of 9000 pounds to any carrier
operating vehicles licensed for a gross weight of 6000 pounds on Jan. 1, 1971.
4. Section 386.510, RSMo 1969, provides in part:
No court in this state, except the circuit courts to the extent herein
specified and the supreme court or the court of appeals on appeal, shall
have jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct or annul any order or deci-
sion of the commission or to suspend or delay the executing or operation
thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere with the commission in the
performance of its official duties.
5. Case No. KCD 26478 (Mo. App., D.K.C., May 6, 1974).
6. 520 S.W.2d at 49.
7. "Tribunal" is used to denote a court, board, corporation, official, or other
person or aggregation of persons, exercising or purporting or attempting to exer-
cise judicial or quasi-judicial powers. 63 AM. JUR. 2D. Prohibition § 2, n.6 (1972).
8. See State ex rel. Taylor v. Nangle, 360 Mo. 122, 227 S.W.2d 655, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950); State ex rel. Allen v. Yeaman, 440 S.W.2d 138 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1969); 63 AM. JUR. 2D. Prohibition § 2, n.6 (1972).
9. §§ 530.010-.090, RSMO 1969; Knisley v. State, 448 S.W.2d 890 (Mo.
1970); State ex rel. Ross Const. Co. v. Skinker, 341 Mo. 28, 32, 106 S.W.2d 409,411
(1937); State ex rel. Elam v. Henson, 217 S.W. 17 (Mo. En Banc 1919); Mo. SUP. CT.
R. 84.22 provides:
No original remedial writ, except habeas corpus, will be issued by an
appellate court in any case wherein adequate relief can be afforded by an
appeal or by application for such writ to a lower court.
See generally Note, The Writ of Prohibition in Missouri, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 511 (1972).
[Vol. 42
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judicial decisions10 and the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act.11 Re-
view of PSC decisions is not governed by the Act 2 because there is a
prescribed review procedure under section 386.510.13 It grants jurisdiction
to review in the circuit court only after the protesting party exhausts all
avenues of administrative review. It also provides that review cases shall be
priority over other civil suits, 14 and that decisions of the PSC may be stayed
at the discretion of the court.
15
In interpreting these provisions, courts have established two basic
principles. First, exclusive original jurisdiction of all subject matter in-
cluded in the PSC Law16 and the Missouri Bus and Truck Law17 is vested in
the PSC.18 In State ex rel. Cirese v. Ridge19 the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected the argument that concurrent jurisdiction existed in the PSC and
the circuit court and held that "matters within the jurisdiction of the
commission must first be determined by it, in every instance, before the
courts will adjudge any phase of the controversy."' 0 Second, the exclusive
method for judicial review of PSC decisions on subject matter within its
jurisdiction is the review procedure under section 386.510.21 In Union
10. State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Mo. Workman Compensation
Comm'n, 320 Mo. 893, 898, 8 S.W.2d 897, 899 (En Banc 1928); State ex rel. Atkins
v. Mo. Bd. of Accountancy, 351 S.W.2d 483, 489 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
11. § 536.150, RSMo 1969.
12. The Missouri Administrative Procedure Act provides in part:
Any person. . . shall be entitled to judicial review thereof, as provided in
section 536.100 to 536.140, unless some other provision for judicial
review is provided by statute....
§ 536.100, RSMo 1969.
13. § 536.100, RSMo 1969. See Sporleder, Judicial Review of Orders and Deci-
sions of the Missouri Public Service Commission, 28 J. Mo. BAR 376 (1972); Davis, supra
note 2, at 295-302.
14. §§ 386.520-.530, RSMo 1969.
15. § 386.520, RSMo 1969.
16. Ch. 386, RSMo 1969.
17. Ch. 390, RSMo 1969.
18. State ex rel. PSC v. Blair, 347 Mo. 220, 228-31, 146 S.W.2d 865, 868-70
(En Banc 1940); State ex rel. PSC v. Mulloy, 333 Mo. 282, 287-88, 62 S.W.2d 730,
731-32 (En Banc 1933); Speas v. Kansas City, 329 Mo. 184, 198,44 S.W.2d 108,*114
(1931); Katz Drug Co. v. K.C. Power & Light Co., 303 S.W.2d 672, 679 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1957).
19. 345 Mo. 1096, 138 S.W.2d 1012 (En Banc 1940).
20. Id. at 1101, 138 S.W.2d at 1015.
21. State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Luten, 459 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Mo. En
Banc 1970) (dictum); State ex rel. Spanish Lake Services Inc. v. Luten, 500 S.W.2d
46, 48-49 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973).
Direct judicial review of administrative bodies that are judicial or quasi-judicial
in nature is guaranteed by the Missouri constitution. MO. CONsT. art. V, § 22. The
legislature has the power to provide the method for such review, including the
designation of courts which have the jurisdiction to review particular proceedings.
Warnecke v. State Tax Comm'n, 340 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Mo. 1960); Ward v. PSC,
341 Mo. 227, 234, 108 S.W.2d 136, 139 (1937).
When courts review decisions of the PSC under section 386.510, the scope of
review is limited to whether the decision is authorized by law and supported by
1977]
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Electric Company v. Clark22 the Missouri Supreme Court dismissed a suit for
a declaratory judgment which sought to invalidate an order of the PSC and
declared: "IT]he procedure provided for in § 386.510 is exclusive and
jurisdictional."
State ex reL Public Service Commission v. Blair24 provides an exception to
these two principles. The court refused to apply the principles when it
found the subject matter of the PSC action to be clearly outside its jurisdic-
tion. 2 5 It emphasized, however, that the statutory review procedure was
exclusive if the decision of the PSC was within "the performance of its
duties."26 The court also declared that if the statute was unclear, the PSC
had the power to determine its own jurisdiction in the first instance. 27
The supreme court in Toedebusch cited the result in Blair as ". . . some
authority for the position that the exclusionary provisions of § 386.510...
is [sic] not an absolute exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts."28 Compar-
ing the facts of Blair and Toedebusch, the court noted that both challenged
the jurisdiction of the PSC, sought a construction of section 390.030, and
contained no PSC hearing to review. The court concluded that appeal
through the statutory procedure in Toedebusch was an inadequate remedy
because of the expense of appealing fifty-one cases and the impact of these
priority cases upon the docket of the chosen court and other litigants in
that court.2
9
competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record. State ex rel. Chicago
R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. PSC, 312 S.W.2d 791, 791 (Mo. En Banc 1958); State ex rel.
Centropolis v. PSC, 472 S.W.2d 24, 25-26 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971). See Davis, supra
note 2, at 295-302; Sporleder, supra note 13.
In circumstances where there is a conflict of regulatory power between the PSC
and another government entity, it may be possible indirectly to secure judicial
review of PSC orders by collateral attack on the claim that the regulatory activity
invades the jurisdiction of the PSC. See Union Electric Co. v. City of Crestwood, 499
S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1973); Wilson, State and Local Government-Control of Intercity High
Voltage Transmission Lines, 39 Mo. L. REV. 658 (1974).
22. 511 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1974).
23. Id. at 825.
24. 347 Mo. 220, 146 S.W.2d 865 (En Banc 1941). A group of truckers,
without requesting a hearing before the PSC, petitioned the circuit court for a
declaratory judgment to determine whether their operations came within the
jurisdiction of the Commission under the Bus and Truck Act of 1931 and for an
injunction to prohibit the PSC and others from arresting them for violations of the
Act. The PSC then petitioned the Missouri Supreme Court to prohibit the circuit
court judge from proceeding further in the suit. The court not only refused to
grant prohibition, but went on to interpret the statute in a manner which exempted
the truckers from its provisions.
25. Id. at 230, 146 S.W.2d at 870.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 236, 146 S.W.2d at 874.
28. 520 S.W.2d at 49 (emphasis in original).
29. The court rejected a strong dissent in the court of appeals contending
primarily that the statutory review procedure provided a speedy and adequate
remedy. The dissent distinguished Blair as a situation in which there was a com-
plete absence of jurisdiction in the PSC, whereas in Toedebusch the PSC unquestion-
ably had jurisdiction of a matter pending before it. It also maintained that the cost
[Vol. 42300
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It could be argued that Toedebusch means .that any challenge to the
jurisdiction of the PSC which would result in a large number of appeals is a
basis for the protesting party to disregard the statutory review procedure
and petition for prohibition. However, such an argument will probably be
rejected because the impact of Toedebusch is limited by several factors. First,
the court placed a caveat on its decision: "In saying [that prohibition will
lie] we do not wish to pave the way for frequent suits of this nature. 30
Second, prohibition will only lie when the relator contends that the PSC is
acting beyond its jurisdiction. 31 Third, the relators in Toedebusch chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the directing statute, not a finding of the
PSC.32 Fourth, in both Toedebusch and Blair no PSC hearing had occurred
for the circuit court to review.
An issue not discussed by the court was the availability of consolidation
of claims in circuit court to avoid problems of multiple litigation. The
Missouri Supreme Court Rules grant courts the discretionary power to
consolidate actions involving common questions of law or fact.33 In
Toedebusch, the suits in circuit court would have involved identical factual
situations with common questions of law-i.e., the constitutionality of the
directing statute and the proper jurisdiction of the PSC. This commentator
could find no reason why consolidation would not be appropriate.
Prohibition is an extraordinary measure to be used only in cases where
there is clearly no other adequate legal remedy. The Missouri Supreme
Court in Toedebusch declared that prohibition would lie to solve problems
of multiple litigation because the expense and impact on the circuit court of
the statutory method make it an inadequate remedy. However, such
method is not inadequate because the appeals thereunder could be consoli-
dated in the circuit court and thus avoid any excessive expense or adverse
impact. The court may have been motivated to ignore such consolidation
by a general dissatisfaction with the statutory review procedure or a desire
to make a decision on the merits of the challenge. Nevertheless, the court
has needlessly entrenched an exception to the exclusive method of review
provided by section 386.510.
BRIAN J. FINUCANE
of litigation was not a sufficient cause for the use of prohibition and consolidation
was available to avoid problems of multiple litigation. Case No. KCD 26478 (Mo.
App., D.K.C. May 6, 1974) (Pritchard, J., dissenting).
30. 520 S.W.2d at 49.
31. By definition, prohibition is a remedy restricted to cases where there is an
act in excess of jurisdiction. See notes 10-12 supra.
32. In many cases there will be no constitutional ground to attack the au-
thorizing statute and the challenge will be to the findings of fact by the PSC.
33. See Mo. Sup. CT. R. 66.01(b):
When civil actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all
the matters in issue in the civil actions; it may order all the civil actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
State ex rel. Allen v. Yeaman, 440 S.W.2d 138 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
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